IDF confirmed Hamas chief was underground hours before October 7 attack
Newly declassified details reveal that Israeli intelligence tracked Muhammad Deif into a command bunker at midnight, yet did not raise the alert level for an imminent strike.
By Andrew Bennett ·
On the night of October 6, 2023, Israeli intelligence officers watched a specific set of digital signals light up across the Gaza border. The data indicated that top Hamas commanders were moving into subterranean positions. This specific pattern of activity had not been seen in the same way for years. The military identified these movements as one of five distinct warning signs pointing to an unusual buildup of force.
The most critical element of the intelligence was the activation of an underground command center. This facility was designated for use only during emergencies. At approximately midnight, the system came online. The identification of this activity led military commanders to redirect a surveillance drone from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. The goal was to determine if the center was being used by an aide or by Muhammad Deif himself, the commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
In the hours that followed, the drone arrived over the site but failed to provide a visual confirmation of Deif’s presence. In the moment, the intelligence remained ambiguous. However, subsequent analysis confirmed that Deif had indeed entered the bunker. This specific location was intended to serve as a secure base for the Hamas leadership during times of crisis. The failure to confirm his location in real time meant that the anomaly remained a mystery to intelligence staff during the critical hours before the attack.
The military response to these signals was measured but immediate. The Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet security service dispatched a specialized counterterror unit to the border. This force, known as a Tequila team, combined fighters from the Shin Bet and the police’s Yamam unit. The team was deployed to maintain a state of alert. Their mandate focused on advanced capabilities unrelated to a standard terrorist infiltration scenario.
Some officials within the Shin Bet viewed the activity at the emergency compound as a potential tactical opportunity. If Deif’s presence had been confirmed, there was a discussion about attempting to eliminate him. The investigation into the events of that night revealed that the decision-making process was complicated by years of established assessments. Intelligence officials believed that Hamas was maintaining its routine. This perception caused them to weigh the new anomalies against historical patterns of activity.
The newly cleared information details other specific preparations observed that night. Hamas operatives removed tarps from rocket-launching tunnel shafts. There were also noted movements within the group's anti-tank missile array. These actions, combined with the activation of dozens of Israeli SIM cards held by the Nukhba force, created a cumulative picture of unusual activity. Until Wednesday, most of these specific signs had remained classified. The SIM card activation was the only anomaly previously released for public consumption.
The military’s investigation concluded that no single sign was strong enough to trigger an immediate, all-out alert. Some of the indicators had alternative explanations or had occurred in the past without leading to a major attack. Intelligence officers conducted numerous checks to confirm or refute the possibility of a strike. While some signs were dismissed, others remained open. No officer interpreted the combined data as a guarantee that an attack was imminent.
The review found that a full intelligence picture, had it been presented to top officers in a different format, might have led to a decision to raise the alert level for a pinpoint attack. The failure was attributed to decision-making processes based on long-standing, false assessments of Hamas capabilities. This context is part of a broader inquiry into the military's conduct on the night of the attack. The findings were authorized for publication on Wednesday.
The attack on October 7 resulted in the deaths of more than 1,200 people in Israel, most of whom were civilians. An additional 251 people were taken hostage. The assault launched a war in Gaza that continued until a ceasefire was established in October 2025. Muhammad Deif, who led the military wing for years and survived multiple assassination attempts, was killed in a strike in Khan Younis in July 2024.
